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FINDING FOOTING IN A POSTMODERN CONCEPTION  
OF LAW
Bryan Druzin
INTRODUCTION
To what extent are the basic principles that underlie our legal 
system universal? To what extent do they follow the dictates of 
human reason and appeal to an intuitive sense of what is fair, and 
are not simply the products of specific historical, economic, and 
cultural circumstances? If one believes they are in fact universal 
in character, one would expect to find general symmetry between 
the concepts that gird our legal systems. Criminal codes between 
legal cultures should mirror one another, as should other areas of 
law ranging from family law to constitutional law. The law of tort, 
for instance, where the chief aim is restitutio in integrum,1 namely a 
remedy that is fair to all parties involved, a body of law founded upon 
an intrinsic sense of fairness applied to the mundane particularities 
of human interaction—should likewise exhibit homogeny between 
legal cultures.
Yet, we do not find this degree of uniformity.2 Legal conceptions 
of what is fair are not always identical between legal systems, 
influenced significantly by religious, cultural, and arguably, 
economic factors. Not only do understandings of fair play sometimes 
differ between legal systems, even within a single unified system of 
law, such as the English common law, the concepts that underlie 
the law have changed over time. Wholly new principles, such as 
criminal insanity and negligence have been introduced. The law has 
transformed significantly over time, adapting to the trappings of its 
historical age. Conceptions of nuisance, trespass to land, and trespass 
to chattels have evolved in a fashion that seems inseparable from 
1 “Restoration to the original position.” Oxford Dictionary of Law 464 (6th ed. 2006).
2 As one justice opined, there is indeed “a jungle of separate, broadly based jurisdictions all 
over the world.” Lord Goff in Airbus Industri GIE v Patel 1 AC 199 (1999).
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Its implications are profound, and thus, we must address it. This 
short paper will do just that, suggesting that, despite the absolute, all-
consuming nihilism towards which postmodernism seems to lead in 
its most extreme form, the acceptance of postmodern relativism in 
fact in no way undermines the possibility of finding firm footing on 
which to stand, of finding moral certainty, and thus solid ground for 
our legal principles. To do this, the discussion that follows detours 
significantly from the conventional route of a law paper; I ask for the 
reader’s patience in travelling this circuitous path through the terrain 
of philosophy. Notwithstanding this, however, the discussion’s final 
destination indeed directly addresses the very foundations upon 
which our conceptions of law are typically constructed, the heart of 
law—our sense of what is just. 
I.    THE JETTISONING OF OBEJCTIVE MORAL TRUTH
A. Subjectivity In The Law
To an extent, we already tacitly acknowledge a degree of moral 
relativism in the law. We establish legal standards to govern our 
society presumably founded upon moral imperatives, yet readily 
accept the validity of quite different legal standards within other 
cultures. I say to an extent because if the difference is too extreme, 
too egregious, we do not accept it. However, it is remarkable how 
high the threshold actually is for this measure of acceptance. It is 
 
correct in our beliefs, and our beliefs are not simply subjective concoctions, but rather are 
out there, existing as objective moral truths. In a sense, our reaction to the argument of 
postmodernism goes far in explaining why we believe there is objective truth in the first 
place, i.e. we simply need to.  To pose the question differently, do we need to believe in the 
value systems we do because they are true, or do we believe them to be true because we 
need to? Perhaps, there is a greater emotional compulsion lurking behind our beliefs than 
we are willing to acknowledge. A good example of this is religious belief. The vast majority 
of individuals who boast deeply held religious beliefs, subscribe to the very religion in 
which they were raised to believe. It is remarkable how this fact does not cause intelligent 
people to question at least the motivation behind their religious convictions. 
principles of private property and economic necessity—concepts 
integrally linked to specific economic systems such as capitalism.3 
Many areas of tort such as economic torts are explicitly connected 
to certain economic positions that have emerged over time. This 
includes areas such as consumer protection, product liability, and 
restraint of trade. Even damages for intangible losses such as pain 
and suffering in the form of pure mental anguish reflects a certain 
cultural perspective. Family law, commercial law, and criminal law 
have all similarly undergone varying degrees of transformation. 
Thus, we do not find a static view of fairness as defined by law; 
rather, we have a shifting body of conceptions, in a state of subtle 
flux, continually experiencing change in reaction to general shifts in 
cultural attitudes. 
What then are we left with when we consider the possibility 
that these legal principles are not extracted from immutable natural 
truths, but rather are largely subjective concoctions of the cultures 
that formulate them, specific to the values of that particular age? It 
is, in a sense, frightening. It strikes at the very heart of our sense of 
justice. It seems that upon the shifting sands of postmodern moral 
relativism, there is no firm footing on which to stand. So what are we 
left with? Does not the denial of objective truth ultimately undercut 
the premise that there is objective value –the very notion of justice? 
Are we left with only the prospect of uncertainty and moral anarchy? 
Is this Nihilism?4 The argument of postmodernism is a powerful one. 
3 See Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston & Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort 
Law 113 (6th ed. 2008), writing on negligence in particular (“Its expansion, in particular 
in the course of the twentieth century, reflects the pressures that the rise of an industrial 
and urban society have brought to bear upon the traditional categories of legal redress for 
interference and protected interests. The growth and increasing sophistication of insurance 
have also contributed to this expansion. A doctrinal examination of negligence must not 
lose sight of this wider social and economic context within which the tort has developed, 
which is reflected in fluidity of the central legal concepts and the courts’ ever-increasing 
recourse to ‘policy’ as an explanation of their decisions.”) (footnotes omitted).
4 The fact that most people find the possibility that our beliefs are not grounded upon any 
objectively valid criteria frightening, perhaps points to the very motivation for believing 
in the conventions we do. That is, there is a deep human need to affix certain moral truths 
to our systems of value as it provides a degree of emotional certainty that we are indeed 
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subjectivity beyond mere technical issues of jurisdiction. This is the 
deeper issue at play within the area of Conflicts of Law. On a purely 
practical level, our legal system often collides with other systems 
of law predicated on slightly differing notions of right and wrong. 
National laws at variance bring the issue of relativism to the fore in 
stark clarity. 
B. Legal Positivism
Perhaps, it was as a result of a growing realization of the palpable 
disparity between our systems of law in the area of Conflicts of Law 
that legal positivism appeared within the margins of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century jurisprudence, eventually replacing 
earlier natural law notions that held law as inextricably linked with 
a basic sense of justice and yes, morality. This separation of law and 
ethics is profoundly significant. With it, one could simply divorce 
law from morality, and leave legal regulation as a shallow vessel 
of legal positivism, bereft of ethical significance. One could bark 
out the separation thesis as espoused by many legal positivists, the 
idea that legal validity has no inherent connection with morality or a 
conception of justice, and be done with it.8 However, anything short 
8 The Separation Thesis essentially posits the idea that there is “a conceptual separation 
between law and morality, that is, between what the law is, and what the law ought to be . 
. . Once again, the Separation Thesis, properly understood, pertains only to the conditions 
of legal validity. It asserts that the conditions of legal validity do not depend on the moral 
content of the norms in question. What the law is cannot depend on what it ought to be 
in the relevant circumstances. Many contemporary legal Positivists would not subscribe 
to this formulation of the Separation Thesis. A contemporary school of thought, called 
Inclusive Legal Positivism, endorses the Social Thesis, namely, that the basic conditions 
of legal validity derive from social facts, such as social rules or conventions which happen 
to prevail in a given community. But, Inclusive Legal Positivists maintain, legal validity 
is sometimes a matter of the moral content of the norms, depending on the particular 
conventions that happen to prevail in any given community. Those social conventions on 
the basis of which we identify the law may, but need not, contain reference to moral content 
as a condition of legality.” See Andrei Marmor, Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 
“The Nature Of Law” (2001), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/. See also, 
Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics 20-26 (2006).
astonishing how easily we can simply chalk the disparity up to a 
simple difference in cultural mores. 
The age for sexual consent is a good example. In many 
jurisdictions the age is eighteen. However the age of consent under 
Danish law is fifteen.5 While an adult engaging in sexual relations 
with a 15 year-old in the United States would be convicted of child 
molestation and seen generally by society as a paedophile, the exact 
same scenario would be tolerated by Danish society. And although 
this is the case, the rest of the world does not view the Danish legal 
system as sanctioning child molestation. But why not? How can 
this conform to the idea that our laws related to an issue of such 
importance as child molestation are grounded upon universal moral 
truths? Should not most Americans logically view Danish society as 
endorsing child molestation? Similarly, as British, French, German, 
Italian, Australian and Canadian law prohibits the use of execution 
in their respective legal systems, should these judiciaries, in the spirit 
of the law, not then view most U.S. nationals as being accessories 
to murder?6 The Canadian Criminal Code, for instance, provides 
“that every one is a party to an offense who: does or omits to do 
anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or abets 
any person in committing.”7 Is not the whole of American society 
then culpable in that they fail to change these laws? The answer 
of course is no, and the mere mention of the idea seems absurd, as 
we feel each society is free to establish laws that are in line with 
their own moral standards. But again, how can this be reconciled 
with our notion that there is a fixed moral underpinning to the laws 
we enact? Clearly, we do tacitly acknowledge a degree of moral 
5 The Danish Penal Code 1995, s. 222 (1) states: “Any person who has sexual intercourse 
with any child under the age of 15 shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not 
exceeding 6 years”; See also Interpol, Legislation Of Interpol Member States On Sexual 
Offences Against Children (2009), http://www.interpol.int/public/Children/SexualAbuse/
NationalLaws/csaDenmark.asp (“Age of consent for sexual activity: When a person is 
fifteen (15) years old s/he can consent to sexual intercourse”).
6 For an informative listing of abolitionist states, see Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty 
in America: Current Controversies 78-83 (1997).
7 Canadian Criminal Code 1985, s. 21(1) (a).   
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not morality, what is it? Is the concept of justice, the shared human 
recognition of fairness—a grandiose historical myth? What is it, a 
social construction, a hastily written provision in our social contract, 
an internalised norm11 born form an adaptive quality? To use a legal 
turn of phrase, the floodgates open.
C. Critical Legal Studies 
The idea that there exists a relativist quality to law lingering just 
beneath our formalistic assumptions is expressed in the Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS) movement which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as 
an independent subset of legal theory.12 Influenced significantly by 
the ideas of the Frankfurt school (with the exception of Habermas) 
and French poststructuralism, CLS strove to expose as arbitrary 
the received social and political beliefs that underlie and shape our 
systems of law.13 
Postmodern theorists, also known as “anti-foundationalists” and 
“critical legal students,” claim “the law cannot have any foundation 
because there is no foundation for objective knowledge of any 
kind. They say we cannot objectively understand reality because all 
knowledge is contingent on social convention (especially language).” 14 
11 In the social norm literature see, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Evolution of Social 
Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy (Yale Law School, Program for Studies in 
Law, Economics and Public Policy, Working Paper No. 230, 1999); Robert C. Ellickson, 
“The Aim of Order Without Law,” 97 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
150 (1994) Robert Cooter, “Expressive Law and Economics,” 27 Journal of Legal Studies 
585 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, “The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,” 
96 Michigan Law Review 338 (1997); Mark J. Roe, “Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics,” 109 Harvard Law Review 641 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and 
Social Roles,” 96 Columbia Law Review 903 (1996); Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms, 
(2000); Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (1978).
12 See Reza Banakar, and Max Travers, An Introduction to Law and Social Theory 119 
(2002).
13 See generally, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, “The Critical Legal Studies Movement” 
Harv. Law Rev. 561-675 (1983).
14 Gary Saalman, Postmodernism And You: Law (1996), http://www.xenos.org/ministries/
crossroads/dotlaw.htm                                                                      
of absolute postmodern relativism must ultimately be grounded 
upon some form of overarching justification for a given system 
of law, be it some form of natural law, class struggle, or simple 
utilitarianism—there must be an underlying sense that it is correct 
and justified. Without this sense, why then would we even need to 
have it? Does not the fact that we still find it necessary to institute 
laws imply that there is an underlying justification and that this 
rationale is predicated on some semblance of objective truth offering 
at the minimum, pragmatic guidance if not moral direction? 
Legal positivism, however, we should remember, is not wholly 
removed from an underlying idea of social control, or that maintaining 
a certain societal order, or simply the notion that staving off anarchy 
is a ‘good thing.’9 In a sense it replaces one rationale with another. 
But all rationales must be grounded upon an overarching notion of 
what is ‘good’ (for lack of a better word). Without this, the whole 
construction crumbles.10 Carried to its extreme, the postmodern 
position, however, scratches mercilessly at this wound, thus 
threatening to undermine all possible constructions regardless of 
its rationale, by obliterating the idea of objective truth itself. Legal 
positivism, to be sure, is singularly important in that it is a stepping-
stone towards the metastasising of postmodern thought within 
law. By snapping the tether that, for hundreds of years (arguably 
throughout all of human history), bound law to underlying bedrock 
of moral justice, it opens the door towards absolute relativism, and 
leaves us with a fundamental problem yet to be resolved: if law is 
9 See Marmor, op. cit. (“Legal Positivism can accept the claim that law is, by its very nature 
or its essential functions in society, something good that deserves our moral appreciation. 
Nor is Legal Positivism forced to deny the plausible claim that wherever law exists, it 
would have to have a great many prescriptions which coincide with morality. There is 
probably a considerable overlap, and perhaps necessarily so, between the actual content of 
law and morality”).
10 Indeed, the Law and Economics approach to legal study which flourished in the latter 
part of the twentieth century might be conceptualised as yet another attempt to ground law 
in some underlying rationale, this being the idea of economic efficiency, or the rationale 
of utility as borrowed from the discipline of economics. The rationale is certainly distinct 
from, for instance, natural law thinking, but they are in a sense similar in that the approach 
is pinned to an underlying explanatory justification of sorts. 
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we create entire belief structures through the ‘discourses’ through 
which we engage the world.19 Apart from the very process itself of 
creating value, there does not exist any objective truth. 
It is important for us to be clear; it is not that we can never 
achieve objectivity, but rather the whole notion of objectivity itself 
is an unreal concept. It is a figment of our imagination. It simply 
does not, nor ever has existed. This is not the denial of things in 
themselves. It is not solipsism.20 No one is saying the chair is not 
there, or that fire does not burn. Rather, it is a complete denial of 
the objective validity of the value systems we construct around the 
external world. That is, the views that proliferate in relation to the 
objective world. Thus, as there is no ‘real’ in this sense, there is 
simply no hope of objectivity, only perspective. All we can ever 
know is one particular view as an alternative for another. And we 
are forever swimming in these perceptions. Whatever perspective 
the individual or culture engages in, takes on the illusion of truth for 
that individual or culture.   
In a sense, one could argue that the very concept of truth is a by-
product of view. Let us examine this idea by way of illustration using 
two mutually exclusive hypothetical opinions predicated on value: 
opinion A and opinion B. Opinion B necessitates that we see opinion 
A as implicitly wrong. We could never develop opinion B without 
doing so. It is important to understand that it is not that opinion A 
is necessarily wrong; it is that opinion B manifested itself, and thus 
made opinion A appear wrong. Thus, the moment we subscribe to 
opinion B, opinion A will seem erroneous. This is the consequence 
of believing opinion B is right; for opinion B to be right, opinion A 
must become wrong. It is a self-defining process. Likewise, when 
opinion C is adopted, opinions A and B will both appear to be wrong. 
And this is equally true when one goes on to adopt opinion D, E, F 
19 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction144 (1978).
20 “The views that nothing exists outside one’s own mind, or that nothing such can be 
known to exist, are called Solipsism (literally, ‘only-oneself-ism’).” Alan Robert Lacey, 
Dictionary of Philosophy 305 (3rd ed. 1996).  
Thus, there are no foundational principles upon which to position the 
edifice of law. “Principles of law” these theorists go on to conclude 
“could never reflect universal truths . . . only allocations of power 
among social groups. According to these scholars, it is senseless 
to talk about whether a law is right or wrong or moral or amoral. 
Law is whatever the most powerful cultural group in society makes 
it.”15 Indeed, in the CLS perspective of law, all legal “truths” are 
mere mental constructs shaped by social convention. CLS boldly 
contends that objective ethical truth is a fiction, thus “consensus 
within a viable community is all we mean by the truth of ethical 
propositions . . . ”16 CLS theorists pointedly reject the notion that 
there is “good,” or objective morality.17 We are instead confronted 
by the subjective, cultural constructions that society erects to stand 
like ethical fortifications for us to retreat inside. Ultimately, anti-
foundationalist theorists argue, these fortifications are arbitrary 
creations built upon a foundation of sand, the search for objective 
truth “misguided.”18 
D. The Flux Of Mere Opinions
So how deep does this go? The postmodern method of 
deconstruction begins like peeling an onion. Layer after layer is 
pulled away to see what lies underneath, and layer by layer the 
onion is made smaller, until eventually one is left with only its 
empty core—nothing. Carried to its extreme, postmodernism 
deconstructs the very foundations on which the possibility of ever 
arriving at truth with a capital ‘T’ is built. Indeed, it puts forward 
the proposition that truth in this sense does not exist, that there is 
never indeed anything true apart from the values that arise from our 
own subjective constructions, or in the terminology of Foucault, that 
15 Ibid.
16 Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 14 (1987).
17 Ibid. at 70.
18 Ibid. at 14.
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To illustrate this point, let us examine a hypothetical situation 
involving a man, Bartley, who suffers from a very peculiar and 
unique condition: a crippling fear of unwashed grapes. For some 
inexplicable reason, the mere sight of unwashed grapes is enough to 
instill absolute terror into the heart of this man. There is no rational 
reason behind his fear. It is wholly arbitrary, without rhyme or 
reason. Now, what are we supposed to tell this man? Is Bartley’s 
fear objectively valid? No. Does Bartley’s reaction seem correct to 
us? No. Is Bartley’s fear real? This is not as simple. Clearly, his fear, 
or let us refer to it as Bartley’s value system, is real. While his value 
system may not reflect what we understand as real, his fear is very 
real. We cannot deny this fact, no more than we can tell a man who 
hears beauty in a particular piece of music that it is not beautiful. 
Now, to torture Bartley by say locking him in a small room 
filled with crates of unwashed grapes would be, in very real sense, 
immoral. No sane person could make sense of, nor justify, Bartley’s 
intense fear of unwashed grapes. Unquestionably, it presents itself 
as an arbitrary, subjective reaction, solely the product of Bartley’s 
perception. However, equally there is no way to deny that as a 
result of his perception, this man is suffering, and therefore, it then 
becomes, in a very real sense, immoral to intentionally cause him 
to suffer in this way.21 In the case of this man, to torture him with 
unwashed grapes is immoral. It is no longer a subjective view; it is 
an objective reality. There is suffering. When suffering comes into 
being, morality comes into being.22 Likewise, there could not be 
morality without an act having at least the potential to cause suffering, 
or lessen it. Indeed, if the majority of human beings shared Bartley’s 
value system, leaving unwashed grapes lying around might be seen 
as an unspeakable breach of moral behaviour. And it would be. 
21 Assuming no greater good could come of it.
22 Here, and throughout the remainder of the paper, the term ‘suffering’ is used for lack of 
a better word. However, what is meant here by ‘suffering’ is any experience of that which 
we define as negative. This may not necessarily be as profound an experience as the word 
suffering implies. Indeed it may range from the mildest feeling of agitation, or discomfort, 
to the deepest depths of human anguish.  
and so forth, and along we go. With each opinion there will be an 
underlying sense it is at last objectively correct, and this sense will 
persist until it is replaced by a new opinion, a new view.   
On the surface of things, there will appear to a breaking away 
from previously held wrong notions—a general advance towards 
clarity. However, there is no reason to assume that in developing 
opinion B we have become any less deluded as before. There is no 
reason to believe that we are progressing through gradated levels of 
clarity. Instead, all we are left with, with any real certainty, is that 
there is change. Not progressive enlightenment, but mere change. 
And change does not imply that the new standpoint is any more 
inherently valid. Arguably, it will be “valid” precisely until one 
develops a new opinion. If the reader would honestly examine his 
or her own views, his or her own values, and note how they have 
changed over the course of his or her life, it becomes difficult to 
insist that one’s present value system is definitively correct, and will 
not go on to change just as previously held viewpoints have done. 
Likewise, this is true for entire cultures, entire periods of human 
history. 
II.    FINDING OUR FOOTING
A. Bartley And Torture By Unwashed Grapes
So as asked at the beginning of this paper, where does that leave 
us? If our value systems are no more than subjective concoctions, 
none with any exclusive claim to truth, is not a value system that 
condones slavery equally as valid as one that condemns it? What 
about murder? What about genocide? In this wash of subjectivity, 
where is there the possibility for any moral compass? In the blind 
morass of moral relativism, do we not lose our only tether hold to 
truth, to value? The answer is no: we do not. But to understand why, 
we must examine the nature of our most basic conceptions of right 
and wrong. 
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B. Bartley And Death By Vehicular Idiocy
Let us take another example involving Bartley, again illustrating 
the same point. In an effort to alleviate some of the anxiety brought 
about by his debilitating condition, Bartley’s therapist recommends 
he take a vacation. Putting aside his paralysing fear of unwashed 
grapes, Bartley takes his trusted doctor’s advice and takes a trip 
to London, England. He rents a car and plans a route through the 
English countryside, careful to avoid the few wineries that operate 
in the UK. As Bartley winds his way over the empty country roads 
of rural England, finally free of the oppressive terror of unhygienic 
grapes, he notices a tractor-trailer heading directly towards him. The 
massive truck is driving on the same side of the road as Bartley 
and refusing to change lanes. Bartley is bewildered. As Bartley 
frantically sounds his horn, the horn of the truck blares back at 
him, and the truck continues to barrel towards poor Bartley. Bartley 
panics yet again wishing he had never left home. And just at the 
point of impact, as Bartley’s small car is about to be utterly crushed 
by the tractor trailer, we still the frame and notice (of course) that 
Bartley is driving on the right side of the road. 
Clearly, if you will, we have here two conflicting value systems: 
a value system that deems driving on the right side of the road as 
correct and one that posits the left side of the road as correct. This 
highlights the postmodern dilemma in distinct terms. Driving on the 
right side of road is no more inherently valid than driving on the left. 
Certainly, this practice of driving on one side of the road or the other 
is no more than a mere cultural phenomenon, having no objective 
claim to being any truer than any other. What we have here are rules 
completely unrelated to any moral framework—a set of norms that 
show themselves as utterly subjective social constructions. That is 
fine enough, but what are we to tell Bartley who is about to be killed 
by oncoming traffic? Does it make a whit of difference?  The rules do 
not have any objective reality to them in the sense that they are not 
grounded on any universal truth; however, the result (his impending 
But we must go further and ask the question: why is Bartley’s 
fear of unwashed grapes any less credible than our fears? Why 
should we not extend this same analysis to our fear of loneliness, 
cold, starvation, or even our fear of death? Equally, why should we 
not question our love of warmth, food, security, power, and beauty? 
To imagine these things may be totally arbitrary seems grossly 
counter-intuitive. They appear to be extracted from indelible truths 
prescribed by nature itself. One would of course reply that Bartley’s 
fear is unfounded as nothing ‘harmful’ would result from contact 
with unwashed grapes, while our fear of cold is rational because 
our bodies may become sick as a result of overexposure to cold. But 
we must not stop here let us keep going. Well, if the body becomes 
sick, it may cease functioning. If it ceases functioning, we may die. 
And . . . if we die, this is a bad thing. And so there we have it: 
indisputable truth. 
However, we must follow our analysis to its inevitable 
conclusion. How is the human fear of death itself unlike Bartley’s 
fear of unwashed grapes?  How is it any less arbitrary? Is it not only 
because these value determinations are so deeply embedded into our 
psyche, so necessitated by our physical state, and so pervasive and 
commonly held, that they seem beyond question—that they appear to 
us to possess categorical objectivity? These are value assumptions so 
entrenched into the nature of being alive, that it is inconceivable that, 
at the end of the day, they are not rooted in the real. And yet, they are 
not. If we could step beyond these patterns of belief that bind us to the 
blind acceptance that our values are self-evident truths, we would see 
clearly that, in the final analysis, our value system is wholly relative 
and no less arbitrary than Bartley’s. But to put it mildly, this is a 
difficult thing to do. In fact, it is a virtually impossible thing to do, and 
our very inability to grasp this reality, speaks to how deeply rooted and 
powerful these perceptions really are.  There is no difference between 
any of us and Bartley. All value is constructed, not intrinsic. Indeed 
the entire edifice of value itself—of any sense of value—is just the 
equivalent of unwashed grapes. 
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is its very core. Put simply, it is not the basis of right and wrong, it 
is the progenitor of right and wrong. Value is never anything more 
than the sum total of suffering and the lack of it. Human suffering is 
not the defining factor of value; it is not a mechanism through which 
to measure value—it is value.
An act in itself has no implicit moral character. It is the 
occurrence of suffering that provides a moral context through which 
an act becomes either right or wrong. To illustrate this point, let us 
return then to the question raised above regarding slavery. Imagine a 
situation in which the institution of slavery did not in any way create 
even a trace of human suffering—a situation where the slave did not 
experience pain (physical or emotional) as a result of his bondage. 
Even the master was not morally corrupted by this exploitive 
relationship, and does not mentally suffer as a result of his cruelty. 
Certainly, this kind of situation is not possible, but for argument’s 
sake, let us supposes this is the case—absolutely no suffering is 
created for any parties, directly or otherwise. How could we then say 
that this situation is morally wrong? We could not. Once the element 
of suffering is taken out of the equation, the physical act of slavery 
ceases to possess any moral significance.24 This does not seem to 
gel with our fundamental notions of right and wrong. It is, however, 
only because we intuitively recognize that this situation could never 
truly arise, that it appears so patently wrong. It is because we are 
aware that slavery as an institution is the cause of such misery that it 
is morally repugnant to us. However, let us not confuse the issue; it is 
not the act of slavery itself, it is the suffering it creates. The element 
of pain once introduced upon our emotional landscape imbues the 
world with a measure of moral reality. We construct entire value 
systems within which we then live, but the moment we react to these 
 
24 Kant though, and many other philosophers who view conforms to a Deontological 
ethics, would adamantly disagree. Kant for one places emphasis on the act itself, and not 
merely the consequences of the act, famously arguing that it would be even wrong to lie 
to a murderer asking the whereabouts of a potential victim. See C. Korsgaard, “Kant on 
Dealing With Evil” in James P. Sterba, Ethics: The Big Questions (1998).
death) is very real. That is to say, is there any question that traffic 
rules are arbitrary? But of what use is this insight when you are 
hit by a truck? If a man takes it upon himself (unlike Bartley) to 
intentionally drive on the right side of the road in a place where the 
rules dictate that traffic must drive on the left, is it not then a moral 
issue? People are going to get hurt; it does not matter that the rules 
are not founded upon objective truth. In a very real sense, they have 
become objective truths. 
C. Pain And Moral Clarity
Let us now return to poor Bartley in the first example. How 
could subjecting this man to unwashed grapes be morally wrong? 
Let us get to the heart of the matter. It is wrong because in doing so 
we would cause Bartley to suffer, and it is precisely human suffering 
that is the yardstick with which to gauge right from wrong—the 
core underpinning to justice. Indeed, it is, and always has been, the 
only process through which “good” is defined; the whole of morality 
is grounded upon the extent to which an act creates suffering and 
the extent to which the act reduces suffering. This is all morality 
ever is. Although it may flower into systems of ethical complexity, it 
remains nothing more than just this. All sense of value is ultimately 
contingent upon this experience, and evolves from it. The experience 
of suffering physical or mental, is the very definition of “negative.” 
Negative has no meaning beyond this.23 “Negative” is the experience 
of suffering, and its inverse, “positive,” is the cessation of this very 
same sense of suffering. It is a self-defining process that in no 
uncertain terms “reifies” itself. Once it is ushered into existence, it 
is “real.” The experience of suffering is the root of good and bad. It 
23 Some might argue that human suffering is useful and has a function in life, in that it is 
conducive to great art, or human progress, but this is just semantics. What these advocates 
of suffering are really saying is that great art or human progress is worth the suffering. 
However, something can only be “worth it” if, in some way, it is a short-term sacrifice for 
a greater good. And what is “good” but ultimately reducing suffering? There is no way 
around this.
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positing “happiness” as having intrinsic value. However, although 
similar, there is a slight difference: the emphasis here is not on 
maximizing utility, but on finding a stable underfooting of value on 
which to stand at all. We can be said to be taking from utilitarianism 
only what is necessary to establish firm ground upon which to plant 
our footing upon the shifting sands of postmodern relativism. Issues 
of maximizing utility for the greatest good are purposively not 
brought into the discussion. The difference is: subjective reaction is 
not a tool with which to gauge the moral nature of an act, rather, it is 
the moral nature of an act—it is value. The point being made here is 
that subjective reaction is the very creation, or “reification” of value. 
There is simply no value outside of this phenomenon, regardless of 
whatever convoluted expression it assumes. Value does not exist in 
a vacuum; it is an interpretive process.
Bentham once famously decried the notion of natural law as 
“nonsense upon stilts.”26 Let us now carry it further: the notion of 
objective value at all is nonsense upon even higher stilts. Value is 
no more than an individual’s subjective interpretation of events; an 
interpretation that can be enlarged to subsume entire cultures that 
have formed consensus around it. Thus, subjective reaction is not 
so much a mechanism through which we may quantify the moral 
nature of an act, rather, it is the very creation of value; value does 
not, nor ever has existed outside of this subjective process—as 
postmodernism suggests, it is solely a human construction. But, 
nevertheless, it is here in the core of this process of construction, 
that we can discover a degree of constancy.
agent on that occasion. Hedonism then claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic 
good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad. Together these claims imply that an 
act is morally right if and only if that act causes “the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number,” as the common slogan says.”) (footnotes omitted).
26 Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies; Being An Examination of the Declarations 
of Rights Issued During the French Revolution” in John Bowring, The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham 501 (1843).
constructions, all subjectivity ends. Our reactions are real. There is 
good and bad, right and wrong.
It is important to understand that what is being denied here is not 
that our belief systems and sense of value are largely determined by 
culture, economics etc., but rather that these subjective constructions 
preclude any possibility of clear moral guidance—just because they 
are subjective does not make them any less “real.” Entire value 
systems are, as postmodernism contends, subjective creations. It is 
the very perception of value that creates value.  Beyond the bonds of 
experience, value does not, nor ever has existed; when we speak of 
value and we speak of an individual’s perception, we are speaking 
of one and the same thing. However, once it is created, it is very 
real. In that they ultimately create the experience of suffering or the 
lack of it, morality is thus reified. That is, the parameters are created 
through a wholly subjective process, but once created, we live and 
die within these very parameters. The postmodern argument fails to 
recognize this truth, and it is precisely this truth that no amount of 
postmodern relativism can undermine.
D. How This Is, And Is Not, Utilitarianism
This might be understood as Utilitarianism, or perhaps even a 
refined version of hedonism. To a certain extent this is true. The 
basic goal of utilitarianism is to offer a means with which to arrive 
at somehow valid normative propositions regarding what is “just” 
by positing the principle of maximizing individual’s experience of 
happiness as a way to gauge what is right.25 Similarly, we are here 
25 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism,” Stanford Encyclopedia 
Of Philosophy,  (2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ (“The 
paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were 
Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). . . . 
Classic Utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism. Act consequentialism is 
the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, 
that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of 
bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the 
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that we find firm footing on which to distinguish right from wrong—
here we have a piece of “reality” on to which we can firmly clutch. 
It is here that the laws we formulate cease to be arbitrary fabrications 
and become rooted in fixed moral truth. It is a simple and familiar 
formula: the generation of suffering is inherently bad; conversely, 
the cessation of human suffering is good. It is logistically difficult 
to quantify, but is endowed with a quality of reality, of universal 
truth, more than capable of withstanding the nihilistic blows of moral 
relativism engendered by postmodern thought. The basis of law has 
credence only in so far as it conforms to this principle, and no more.
CONCLUSION
Our reasoning here accepts full throttle the inevitable conclusions 
to which postmodern thought leads us: value is the machinations of 
culture and subjective reaction. But at the end of the day, the measure 
of certainty implicit in these very reactions provides stability within 
this moral turmoil. Bartley’s reaction to unwashed grapes constructs 
the possibility of value, and brings it into existence where otherwise 
it simply would not be present. As Bartley’s reaction is what allows 
the possibility of value, we can turn to the very reaction for moral 
guidance.  To bemoan the fact that value constructs are subjective 
is rather odd, if not irrelevant; it does not matter. We eventually 
come full circle. The reaction is value. Thus, once created, it is as 
real as anything, and is a point of stability that postmodern moral 
relativism cannot undercut.  It does not matter what course we follow 
to stimulate those reactions. Subjective concoctions or not, they are 
real. And they are foundational principles. 
The postmodern argument is a powerful one precisely because it 
reveals in unapologetic clarity the true magnitude of our ignorance. 
The subjective nature of our conceptions of the world is exposed for 
what they are. Nevertheless, this does not disenfranchise morality. 
On the contrary, in that the process of deconstruction sets our value 
systems in proper relief, the moral superstructure on which they are 
based becomes that much clearer, and thus reinvigorated. Our value 
systems are stripped of all claims to objective authority, but yet the 
end result remains the same—it makes no difference. There is right 
and wrong. Ultimately, all postmodernism does is force us to set 
aside the exterior expressions of “justice,” and instead root our legal 
conceptions at this more fundamental level.
Value structures as reflected in the law may shift and change over 
time. As with all value systems, codified systems of law, and the 
principles they establish such as nuisance, trespass, and negligence, are 
highly determined by the particular cultural context from which they 
arise. However, it is in the intrinsically negative quality of suffering 
